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In 1995, the annual meetings of the American Economic Association included a 
plenary session about domestic policy issues.  One of the panelists was the Nobel laureate 
MIT economist Robert Solow.  In the course of his remarks, Solow said that he did not find 
school choice appealing.  During the question and answer period, I asked him why he did not 
find school vouchers appealing.  He replied: “It isn’t for any economic reason; all the 
economic reasons favor school vouchers.  It is because what made me an American is the 
United States Army and the public school system.” 
Admirable in its candor and lucidity, Solow’s reply might suggest a solution to a 
broader conundrum.  If government intervention creates an official and common frame of 
reference, a set of cultural focal points, a sense of togetherness and common experience, then 
almost any form of government intervention can help to “make us Americans.”  If people see 
government activism as a singular way of binding society together, then they may favor any 
particular government intervention for its own sake --whether it be government intervention 
in schooling, urban transit, postal services, Social Security, or anything else-- because they 
love the way in which it makes them American. 
Of course,  love of government as a binding and collectivizing force does not exist in 
anyone’s sensibilities as an absolute.  Everyone seeks other goals as well and understands that 
some government interventions are more costly than voluntary solutions, and people make 
their judgments according to their understanding.     2
People may favor government for other reasons:  they fancy themselves part of the 
governing set; they yearn for an official system of validation; they want to avoid the burden of 
justifying a dissenting view; they fear, revere or worship power.  All such factors work in 
conjunction with self-serving tendencies of less existential nature—privilege seeking, subsidy 
seeking, and so on—and with the rationalizations of these tendencies.  Furthermore, people 
may be biased toward government because cultural institutions indoctrinate and cow them. 
All such tendencies may be part of a general account of “collectivism”—in the sense 
of statism.  In this article, I seek to expand our understanding of  just one factor of 
collectivism that never operates in isolation from the others and not necessarily the most 
significant:  people’s tendency to see and love government as a binding communitarian force. 
I take notice of  that tendency in realms that range from the texts of Hegel and Marx to recent 
political philosophy to mundane policy discourse.  I am an errant economist with no claim to 
mastery of materials here dealt with.  I can only say that the constellation outlined in this 
article is one that I discern as clearly as I see the Big Dipper, but the points of light 
themselves wax and wane depending on how one gazes. 
 
Beating Time Together 
 
When we think of the action of the primitive band, the family, or the organization, we 
think of the whole acting as an integrated entity.  We may fail to consider that the posited 
entity consists of constitutive elements or members.  We may neglect to think how each 
member experiences his membership in the entity, and achieves with the other members the 
consonance in action that permits us to say the entity acts in this or that way.   
Georg Simmel comments on what is perhaps the most manifest exhibition of the 
human social organism:   3
It is interesting to observe how the prevalence of the socializing impulse in 
primitive peoples affects various institutions, such as the dance.  It has been 
noted quite generally that the dances of primitive races exhibit a remarkable 
uniformity in arrangement and rhythm.  The dancing group feels and acts like a 
uniform organism; the dance forces and accustoms a number of individuals, who 
are usually driven to and fro without rime or reason by vacillating conditions 
and needs of life, to be guided by a common impulse and a single common 
motive. ([1904] 1957, 546)  
 
In the social organism, instances of mutual coordination, such as the dancers’ moving to the 
beat of drums, provide the atomic structure of the extensive coordination of the various parts 
that permits us to say that the entity exists and acts as a whole.   
    Unlike a spontaneous order, an organization such as a dance group proceeds, at least 
in skeletal structure, under an authoritative leadership or direction.  A structure of central 
leadership and direction implies an authoritative understanding of the organization’s nature, 
goals, situation, and potential.  The authoritative understanding can be imparted, at least in 
rough and summary terms, to all members of the organization, constituting a common 
understanding and enabling all members to share an experience of the organization’s 
movement and the realization of its goals.  In at least broad, skeletal terms, the members of an 
organization share a common understanding of the extensive coordination achieved in the 
whole, and of how their instances of mutual coordination contribute to—or cooperate in—that 
extensive coordination.
1 
Consonance in the dance, march, chant, song, or ensemble performance is mutual 
coordination of bodily motions made sensate in sight, sound, and vibration.  No wonder so 
many of the terms used to describe mutual coordination originate in music.  We speak of 
                                                 
1 On the two coordinations, see Klein 1997.  Incidentally, my labeling has evolved since the 1997 paper.  I now 
prefer mutual coordination for Schelling coordination and extensive coordination for Hayek coordination.    4
people as acting or being in unison, in consonance, in concert, in concord, in accord, in 
harmony, in sync, in tune with each other. 
 
Smithian Sympathy as Sentiment Coordination  
 
When a marching band performs on a field, spectator view the extensive coordination 
of the spectacle in common.  Watching from the stands, they also enjoy a mutual coordination 
-- not of their bodily motions or actions but rather their sensations, perceptions, 
understandings, and sentiments.  Even if they watch from their homes, on television, they may 
imagine that all viewers dance together in spirit.  In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam 
Smith notes that “nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with 
all the emotions of our own breast” ([1759] 1976, p. 13).  Man yearns for coordinated 
sentiment as he yearns for food in his belly.   
Smith makes use of a certain metaphor repeatedly to describe an individual’s 
elemental joy at being in sentimental consonance with his fellows: 
 
The man whose sympathy keeps time to my grief, cannot but admit the 
reasonableness of my sorrow (16). 
 
[A person suffering misfortune] longs for . . . the entire concord of the affections 
of the spectators with his own.  To see the emotions of their hearts, in every 
respect, beat time to his own . . . constitutes his sole consolation.  (22) 
 
The great pleasure of conversation and society . . . arises from a certain 
correspondence of sentiments and opinions, from a certain harmony of minds, 
which like so many musical instruments coincide and keep time with one 
another.  (337) 
   5
Eight times Smith uses the metaphor of people beating (or keeping) time together.  A 
metaphor he uses even more frequently, about thirty times, is that of “entering into” the 
sentiments of another, which again connotes a common experience and togetherness, as when 
one joins the spirit of the household when one enters into a home. 
Thomas Schelling helps us understand the nature of mutual coordination by setting out 
a problem of togetherness disrupted: 
 
When a man loses his wife in a department store without any prior 
understanding on where to meet if they get separated, the chances are good that 
they will find each other.  It is likely that each will think of some obvious place 
to meet, so obvious that each will be sure that the other is sure it is “obvious” to 
both of them.  One does not simply predict where the other will go, since the 
other will go where he predicts the first to go, which is wherever the first 
predicts the second to predict the first to go, and so ad infinitum.  Not “What 
would I do if I were she?” but “What would I do if I were she wondering what 
she would do if she were I wondering what I would do if I were she . . . ?”  
What is necessary is to coordinate predictions, to read the same message in the 
common situation, to identify the one course of action that their expectations of 
each other can converge on.  They must “mutually recognize” some unique 
signal that coordinates their expectations of each other. (1960, 54 ellipses in 
original) 
 
Schelling’s parable captures the sense of mutuality: Each person thinks about how the 
other understands the situation, and both understand that their understandings interrelate.  
This mutuality resides in organizational life in general, in cooperation, even in the 
organization’s larger, long-in-coming achievements.   
This sense of mutuality, or shared understanding, is precisely what is not present in the 
extensivity of a spontaneous order: if we eat out, we know nothing about the people and 
efforts that contributed to the provision of our lunch, except for those who helped serve it.    6
We can hardly guess what the rest of the chain of provision is like, and we have no particular 
reason to do so.  No mutuality-in-the-whole exists in a spontaneous extensive coordination. 
In Schelling’s exposition of mutual coordination, he explained that when people face a 
coordination problem, they seek a solution in a focal point: 
 
Most situations . . . provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal 
point for each person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be 
expected to do.  Finding the key, or rather finding a key—any key that is 
mutually recognized as the key becomes the key—may depend on imagination 
more than logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, 
symmetry, aesthetic or geometric configuration, casuistic reasoning, and who 
the parties are and what they know about each other. (1960, 57)
  
 
Precedence, symmetry, and so on make focal points focal.  A prime characteristic of 
focal points, says Schelling, “is some kind of prominence or conspicuousness” (57). This 
conspicuousness in turn often depends on perceptible uniqueness (57-58).  The man and 
woman separated in the store might go to the cash register nearest to where they were 
together last—a double uniqueness.  Factors like precedence, symmetry, simplicity, 
accession, and so on often provide the context for people’s  decision about what to seek 
uniqueness in.  The dancers’ movements are coordinated because of the prominence of a 
specific drum beat.  If two distinct drum beats play simultaneously, perhaps neither will be 
focal, and resolution will be sought in a higher-level sign or meta-sign, such as the gestures of 
a group leader.  As Schelling notes, “[t]he coordination game probably lies behind the 
stability of institutions and traditions and perhaps the phenomenon of leadership itself” (91). 
Schelling’s analysis, especially as developed by David Lewis (1969) and other works, 
leads us to see Smithian sympathy as the coordination of sentiments.  Love might be 
interpreted as a sort of coordination equilibrium in which sentiment is reflected and re-
reflected in the lovers’ eyes, such that the sentiment is neither his nor hers, but theirs.  People   7
naturally form relationships and communities built upon the focal points of norms, morals, 
virtues, traditions, and shared conceptions of their history.   
 
 Club  Romance 
 
In cooperating with the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, we talk to them of their 
advantages.  “Give me that which I want and you shall have this which you want” (Smith 
[1776] 1981, 27).  In The Wealth of Nations, Smith shows that a touch of sentiment 
coordination attaches to every market exchange.   
In the rich morality plays of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, the contexts Smith 
discusses are generally those of the individual in his local or private affairs face to face with 
his associates and relations.  Smith is concerned above all with the individual’s moral life and 
conduct.  Almost never does he speak of conduct or sentiments in the context of the broad 
political culture. An optimist especially at the time he first composed the The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, he apparently saw no conflict between the great yearning for coordinated 
sentiment and the prospects for a libertarian polity. 
Smith’s writings furnish a groundwork for libertarian theories of voluntary 
communities and norms (see for example, Paine [1792] 1961, 398-403; Tocqueville [1840] 
1969; Karlson [1993] 2002; Foldvary 1994; Beito , Gordon and Tabarriok 2002; Kukathas 
2003).  In economic theory, goods like fitness clubs, churches, movie theaters, and schools are 
sometimes called “club goods,” as they are experienced or enjoyed jointly by “members” of 
the club (Buchanan 1965).  By analogy, it is useful to refer to coordinated sentiment among a 
voluntary grouping as club romance.  Again, even in “impersonal” market exchanges, there is 
a touch of human communication.  Libertarians like Chandran Kukathas (2003) say that true 
liberals let clubs compete freely and without privilege and tolerate internal club practices that   8
we might find alarming.  Adam Smith said likewise about religious competition, confident 
that voluntarism would teach “candour and moderation” ([1776] 1981, 793). 
 
Encompassing Coordination of Sentiment: The People’s Romance 
 
When a certain further element is added to the desire for sentiment coordination, 
however, the result is ominous.  Although Smith posited a desire for sentiment coordination, 
but he did not speak of the desire for a sentiment coordination that encompasses the whole 
group.  In Smith, we desire to commune with someone.  In encompassing sentiment 
coordination, we fancy the notion of communing with the whole.  In Smith, we desire club 
romance, whereas in encompassing sentiment coordination we desire an official club romance 
where the club is the whole of the people. 
Who is included in “the whole” and who is not depends on social configurations and 
people’s awareness of the group.  When people think of society at large as the group to which 
they belong--when they think of having “citizenship,” whether it be in a town, a county, or a 
country--the logic of coordination leads directly to government as the focal point.    
Unparalleled in power, permanence, and pervasiveness, the government is prominent, 
conspicuous, unique, focal.  Moreover, as people look to government as the focal point, it 
increasingly draws them into thinking of its dominion as the boundaries that define the group.  
The government provides and validates the focal points in the sentiment game, and, in the first 
instance, it arranges and validates the games that citizens can play.   
Government creates common, effectively permanent institutions, such as the streets 
and roads, utility grids, the postal service, and the school system.  In doing so, it determines 
and enforces the setting for an encompassing shared experience—or at least the myth of such 
experience.  The business of politics creates an unfolding series of battles and dramas whose   9
outcomes few can dismiss as unimportant.  National and international news media invite 
citizens to envision themselves as part of an encompassing coordination of sentiments—
whether the focal point is election-day results, the latest effort in the war on drugs, or 
emergency relief to hurricane victims—and a corresponding regard for the state as a romantic 
force.  I call the yearning for encompassing coordination of sentiment the People’s Romance 












Among a group 
 
Encompassing the people 
 
 
The cycle of government-defined-group and group-finds-focal-points-in-government 
mayt help to explain why collectivist notions ascended into the mainstream in Great Britain, 
the United States, and elsewhere so suddenly (around 1890) and aggressively and why 
government size and intervention surged during the ensuing century.  The cycle is implicated 
in the multifaceted problem of surging statism, notably the sanctification of the democratic 
creed of popular sovereignty, and the genre and technology of The-World-is-Watching 
photographic journalism (Weaver 1994, chap. 2).  Robert Higgs’s account of government 
growth in the United States incorporates ideology as a key variable(1987, chap. 3).  The 
concept of TPR may help us to interpret the changes in American ideology that occurred 
during the Progressive Era, World War I, the New Deal, and World War II. 
 
Encompassing: In Aspiration or Imagination 
   10
“Encompassing,” of course, need not not include everyone in the group.  Some 
individuals may be absent, home with the flu, or persisting in reclusiveness.  Moreover, the 
group does not necessarily include everyone in the jurisdiction.  to the group commonly 
distinguishes itself and its sentiments by referring antipathetically to some other kind of 
people.  to the group often plays up an opposition group—a scapegoat group, or other.  Thus, 
the group defines itself in part in relation to the “wetbacks,” “kikes,” “queers,” “hippies,” 
“drug pushers,” “commies,” “left-wingers,” “right-wingers,” “capitalist pig-dogs,” 
“fundamentalists,” “racists,” “rednecks,” and so forth.   
TPR signifies a yearning for a dominant and expanding sentiment coordination, a 
yearning especially upset by the perception that certain individuals have sentiments at odds 
with this feeling.  This yearning seeks conformity and inclusion, and it dislikes deviance, 
discord, and dissension.  The “other,” or scapegoat group, represents the sentiments to be 
diminished, controlled, and eliminated.  TPR is not content to achieve sentiment coordination 
among those who would be coordinated; it wishes to stamp out sentiment discoordination.  It 
tends to be overweening, and if enthusiasm isn’t sufficient, it becomes assertive and 
belligerent.   
The term “encompassing” in our definition (“the yearning for encompassing 
coordination of sentiment), then, is not to be taken literally.  “Encompassing” may be 
understood to mean any of the following: “imagined to be encompassing,” “symbolically 
encompassing” “aspirationally encompassing,” or merely “dominant and official.”   
 
TPR versus Self-ownership 
 
TPR helps us understand how authoritarians and totalitarians think.  If TPR is a 
principal value, the well-being thought to depend on everyone elses’s proper participation,   11
then it authorizes a kind of joint, though not necessarily absolute, ownership of everyone by 
everyone, which means, of course, by the government.  One person’s conspicuous opting out 
of the romance really does damage the interests of the others.   
The essence of property rights lies in other’s duties not to interfere with one’s 
property.  When those duties weigh on us as genuine moral obligations, they are authorized by 
interest—that is, by the property owner’s interest.  If the collectivity’s interest really does 
depend vitally on one’s (uncritical) participation, then the collectivity may well erect an 
apparatus of control and promulgate norms of duty, norms that enjoy social recognition and 
acceptance-in other words, that make one its property.  The statist romantic manifesto is 
clearly set down by Hegel: 
 
It is false to maintain that the foundation of the state is something at the option 
of its members.  It is nearer the truth to say that it is absolutely necessary for 
every individual to be a citizen.  The great advance of the state in modern times 
is that nowadays all the citizens have one and the same end, an absolute and 
permanent end. (1952, 242) 
 
Whereas Hegel saw some mystical, organic foundation for political obligation, 
modern-day social democrats see political consent or “social contract,”  but the upshot is the 
same.  In their social-democratic tract The Cost of Rights, Stephen Holmes and Cass R. 
Sunstein hold that all things are owned, fundamentally and ultimately, by the government.  
“Private property [is] a creation of state action,” “laws [enable property holders] to acquire 
and hold what is ‘theirs’” (1999, 66, 230).  The quotation marks around theirs tell us: the car 
you park in your garage is really the property of the state; the state just lets you think it is 
yours.  Holmes and Sunstein presumably would say that your own person is “yours” only in a 
diminished sense that calls for quotation marks.  Any decentralized exercise of property rights 
or contract is undertaken by the government’s authorized delegation.  Taxes are the fees you   12
pay for having those things—your car, your house, your own person—placed at your disposal.  
Throughout their book, we find indications that their doctrines exist to serve TPR: “To focus 
on the cost of rights is to urge that the collectivity define rights, and spend resources on rights, 
in a way that is broadly defensible to a diverse public engaged in a common enterprise” (216). 
TPR lives off coercion which not only serves as a means of clamping down on 
discoordination, but also gives context for the sentiment coordination to be achieved.  The 
government inculcates the notion of “The People” chiefly by coersion. 
 
Not All Bad, Just Not Worth It 
 
TPR is one human value that libertarian policy does not advance.  In insisting on 
libertarian policy, and hence in turning away from TPR, however, one need not regard TPR in 
itself as something false or perverse or irrational.  The tens of thousands who watched and 
chanted and lifted their arms in unison at the massive National Socialist rallies, in which well-
kept columns marched in lockstep to make a gigantic rotating swastika, no doubt knew an 
awesome elemental human joy, a romance far more powerful than that experienced by 
exultant soccer fans watching their country’s team win the World Cup.   
TPR recommends government activism, and government activism means the 
contravention of the liberty maxim.  I oppose TPR simply because of the damage and 
degradation in entails, not only to material comfort and other values, but to other processes of 
human meaning, dignity, and decency on which joy also depends.  TPR just ain’t worth it.   
Unfortunately, for reasons that cannot discussed here, the damage and degradation are 
difficult to see, and especially so when society’s cultural institutions are highly statist.
 2  The 
                                                 
2 In principle, democracy might choose libertarianism, but problems are legion.  For example, Brennan and 
Lomasky’s (1993) theory of expressive voting fits nicely with TPR, and these analysts show in detail how 
expressive voting deranges the democratic process. 
    13
problem, as I see it, is not so much that those swayed by TPR are morally defective, but that 
they have become locked into a set of unenlightened mental habits.  It is in conjunction with a 




TPR in Karl Marx 
 
TPR is at the heart of communism.  In, Capital, Marx claims that capitalism 
creates cooperation: “As a general rule, labourers cannot co-operate without being brought 
together: their assemblage in one place is a necessary condition of their co-operation.  Hence 
wage labourers cannot co-operate, unless they are employed simultaneously by the same 
capital, the same capitalist, and unless therefore their labour-powers are bought 
simultaneously by him. (1936, 361).  Marx salutes the capitalist entrepreneur for organizing 
labor in his factory according to “a preconceived plan” and coordinating their “union into one 
single productive body” (364).  In his view, however,  the competition between capitalists, 
each engaged in “commodity production” to garner “surplus value,” renders despotic and 
exploitive the extensive coordination of labor achieved within a single factory.  
Marx spins a system of economic nonesense, but over and above the blather is 
an appeal that returns to his idealization of cooperation and the encompassing coordination of 
sentiment -- encompassing both within human society and, correspondingly, within each 
person’s selfhood.  As Robert Tucker explains, Marx presupposed that the division of labor in 
society corresponds to a division of spirit in the self, or alienation (1961, 188-223). 
Of capitalism (or spontaneous order), Marx writes, “the cohesion of the aggregate 
production imposes itself as a blind law upon the agents of production, and not as a law 
                                                 
3 I do  not contend that if people understood better what was good for them, they all would become staunchly 
libertarian, but only that people by and large would become more libertarian than they are now.   14
which, being understood and hence controlled by their common mind, brings the production 
process under their joint control” (1998,  256).  The achieving of conscious control is essential 
to the wholesomeness of work: “Freedom in this field can only consist in socialied man, the 
associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under 
their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature” (1998,  
807).  Marx glorifies the deliberate extensive coordination of labor, but he despised any boss.  
When communism integrates community existence and economic activity, the economy 
would be like one big factory, and, with all parties working in cooperation, the laborer will 
avoid the indignity of subordination because there will be no boss other than the entire 
community of which he belongs (1936, 391).  “[O]nly when [man] has recognized and 
organized his own powers as social powers so that social power is no longer separated from 
him as political power, only then is human emancipation complete” (Marx 1983: 234).   
Marx said that “all labour in which many individuals cooperate necessarily requires a 
commanding will to coordinate and unify the process . . . much as that of an orchestra 
conductor” (1998, 382).  In the great book Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (1961), Robert 
Tucker explains Marx’s utopian vision: “The old authoritarianism of the factory regime, based 
on servitude under the division of labour, would be supplanted by a free conscious discipline 
such as that which prevails in a symphony orchestra… [T]he abolition of the social division of 
labour . . . signifies the advent of harmony and unison within humanity at large, the 
emergence of a unified society consisting of a vast association of ‘complete individuals’” 
(199-200).  Marx insists that, in a wholesome economy, all its participants understand the 
extensive coordination of economic activity as mutual coordination. 
One might say that Marx’s animus is against any sense of social stratification and 
domination, but then one must explain why he is so blind to the social stratification and 
domination inherent in his political schemes.  I submit that in his mind the basic difference   15
between working for a capitalist boss and working for a communist boss is that the 
communist plan permits one to conceive work as participation in a great romance—or TPR.  
In other words, TPR  blinds leftists to the realities of coercion and domination intrinsic in 
their political ideals.
4 
I am not claiming that TPR was Marx’s principal motivation.  That motivation might 
have been much darker, and his doctrines might have been intellectual “superstructure” 
serving his basic drives.  The point applies to any theorist, sage, or leader (as noted by Smith 
[1759] 1976, 233).  We cannot peer into a person’s soul; Only rarely and only in part can we 
separate his stated reasons from his personal drives and motivations.  However, even if 
Marx’s subterranean motivations spang from other sourses TPR is a central component of his 
doctrines and of the movements, and intellectual traditions they inspired. 
 
TPR The ABC of Communism 
 
Marx wrote a great deal about how capitalism works, but very little about how 
communism would work.  When his followers got around to dealing with communism, the 
central role of TPR became clear.  The ABC of Communism, by N. Bukharin and E. 
Preobrazhensky, first written in 1919 and published in 1922, presents an agenda of theft and 
brutality on stupendous scale, rationalized in terms of TPR: 
 
[S]ociety will be transformed into a huge working organization for cooperative 
production.  There will then be neither disintegration of production nor anarchy 
of production.  In such a social order, production will be organized.  No longer 
will one enterprise compete with another; the factories, workshops, mines, and 
other productive institutions will all be subdivisions, as it were, of one vast 
people’s workshop, which will embrace the entire national economy of 
                                                 
4 Isaiah Berlin’s book on Marx may be used to support the notion that TPR is the soul of Marx’s system; see 
Berlin 1963, 131, 139, 143.     16
production.  . . .  The essence of the matter lies in this, that the organization shall 
be cooperative organization of all the members of society.  The communist 
system, in addition to affecting organization, is further distinguished by the fact 
that it puts an end to exploitation, that it abolishes the divisions of society into 
classes. ([1922] 1969, 114-115, emphsis in original) 
 
Here is the logic in all its simplicity:  “The home worker who is dependent upon the 
dealer or the factory owner, works for the dealer or the factory owner.  He becomes their beast 
of burden.  The home worker who is dependent upon the proletarian State is a social worker” 
(328-29).    
 
In capitalist society, class divisions obstruct TPR.  The proletariat must seize and expropriate 
all capitalist operations and resources.  “Manifestly,” say Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, the 
various operations must be linked together.  But “[t]he question arises, with which 
organization must the others be linked up. The answer is simple.  We must select the greatest 
and most powerful of all.  Such an organism is constituted by the State organization of the 
working class, by the Soviet Power (332).   Here we see clearly the pursuit of encompassing 
sentiment coordination and the invocation of the focal means of achieving it. 
According to Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, to bring everyone into the common, 
classless plan, under “a genuine, popular control” (337) the various economic bodies and 
operations must “BE TRANSFORMED INTO ECONOMIC DEPARTMENTS AND 
INSTRUMENTS OF THE STATE AUTHORITY; THEY MUST BE ‘STATIFIED.’ (333, 
capital letters in the original).  Would-be independent agents must take orders and payments 
from the state.  “Thus the home workers will by degrees be drawn within the general system 
of production now being organized upon socialist foundations.  They will be drawn within 
that system, not only by being supplied with certain products of social production, but also   17
because they themselves will be directly working for the proletarian State in accordance with 
a plan prescribed for them by the instruments of the proletarian State”(329). 
 
All this for TPR: “Labour discipline must be based upon the feeling and the 
consciousness that every worker is responsible to his class, upon the consciousness that 
slackness and carelessness are treasons to the common cause of the workers” (339 emphasis 
in original). 
 
TPR in Social Democratic and Communitarian Beliefs 
 
Many authors make clear that social democracy is chiefly about TPR.  In his social-
democratic classic, Bernard Bosanquet writes: “It follows that the State, in this sense, is, 
above all things, not a number of persons, but a working conception of life.  It is, as Plato has 
taught us, the conception by the guidance of which every living member of the 
commonwealth is enabled to perform his function” (1923, 140-41). Columbia University 
professor and Progressive Era economist Edwin Seligman, who studied in Germany and 
helped to professionalize the study and teaching of economics in the United States, writes of 
taxation: “We pay taxes not because we get benefits from the state, but because it is as much 
our duty to support the state as to support ourselves and our family; because, in short, the state 
is an integral part of us” (1925, 73). 
Today, we often hear statist intellectuals and commentators call for “a common 
experience,” “a common understanding,” “a common enterprise,” “a common cause.”  The 
term common has multiple meanings.  It can mean “known,” “ordinary,” “or often-found,” as 
in: “Don’t be embarrassed; on this highway running out of gas is a common occurrence.”  
Another meaning of common is shared or “encompassing”: “Americans enjoyed a common   18
experience in seeing their country put a man on the moon.”Intellectuals and commentators 
have in mind this second meaning.  Thus, in the calls for “a common experience,” “a common 
understanding,” and so forth, we ought to recognize the call for encompassing coordination of 
sentiments—TPR. 
Many statists express the same penchant for shared or common experience: 
 
•  The title of Richard Rorty’s social-democratic tract speaks of TPR: Achieving 
Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (1998; for 
example see 50).  
 
•  Harvard professor Derek Bok writes, “government is the one administrative 
agency that can define, enunciate, and validate a set of common moral 
standards and obligations for all the people” (2001, 12).  Reminiscent of 
William James, Bok finds the idea of national service “all the more compelling 
now that the disappearance of the draft has removed one of the few 
opportunities to gather Americans from all walks of life in a common civic 
undertaking” (409).   
 
•  In After Virtue (1984), Alasdair MacIntyre claims that justice and desert make 
sense only in “a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding 
both of the good for man and the good of that community” (250) and then 
makes the “disquieting suggestion” that our society has lost any such shared 
understanding and that justice and virtue fall into shambles.   
 
•  Benjamin Barber advocates “strong democracy,” which “rests on the idea of a 
self-governing community of citizens who are united less by homogeneous 
interests than by civic education and who are made capable of common 
purpose and mutual action” (1984, 117).  Strong democracy “requires 
institutions that will involve individuals at both the neighborhood and the 
national level in common talk, common decision-making and political 
judgment, and common action” (261).  This ideal seeks coordination on “one   19
common vision of the political and economic world” (263).  “Voucher schemes 
undertaken in a climate of antigovernment privatism will only hasten the death 
of all public seeing and political judgment, enhancing the private power of 
individuals at the expense of a public vision of our common world” (264).  
 
These examples of statist invocations of “common purpose,” and the likemight easily be 
multiplied twentyfold.
5   
 
Superstitions that Sustain The People’s Romance 
 
As noted, the communists veiled the coercion and domination intrinsic to their scheme 
with the notion that the new society would be “classless” and the centralized power would be 
under “a genuine, popular control.”  In modern times, social democracy’s coercion and 
domination are veiled by a set of superstitions and taboos at best only somewhat less fatuous.   
Social democrats tend to see society as an organization administered by government.  This 
creed aids TPR, but many ordinary persons will find the notion oppressive if they think of the 
administration as strictly top down.  Although they want to see a social organization, they do 
not want it to be a strict hierarchy.  The magical element that holds it all together is the idea 
that the government receives its mandate and warrant from ordinary persons.  The democratic 
notion of popular sovereignty tells the ordinary person that he gives license to the 
government, as he does to a voluntary association or club.  This superstition makes the whole 
understanding tolerable.  As de Tocqueville put it, “Our contemporaries are ever a prey to two 
conflicting passions: they feel the need of guidance, and they long to stay free.  Unable to 
wipe out these two contradictory instincts, they try to satisfy them both together.  Their 
imagination conceives a government which is unitary, protective, and all-powerful, but 
                                                 
5  Fine Hayekian critiques of participatory and deliberative democracy are found in the works of David Prychitko 
(2002) Mark Pennington (2003), and Michael Wohlgenmuth (in this issue of the Independent Review).   20
elected by the people.  Centralization is combined with the sovereignty of the people.  That 
gives them a chance to relax.  They console themselves for being under schoolmasters by 
thinking that they have chosen them themselves.  ([1840] 1969, 693).  Thus, citizens “are 
turned alternatively into the playthings of the sovereign and into his masters, being greater 
than kings and less than men” (694). 
Joseph Schumpeter, in his assessment of the social democratic “club” view of society, 
indicates its pervasiveness: “ever since the princes’ feudal incomes ceased to be of major 
importance, the state has been living on a revenue which was being produced in the private 
sphere for private purposes and had to be deflected from these purposes by political force . . .  
The theory which construes taxes on the analogy of club dues or of the purchase of the 
services of, say, a doctor only proves how far removed this part of the social sciences is from 
scientific habits of mind.  (1950, 198) 
 
    I agree with Schumpeter, but this is not the place to debate the social-democratic view.  
The point is that nested within the conventional view that government is not a mammoth 
apparatus of coercion is the tenet that society is an organization to which we belong.  Either 
on the view that we constitute and control the government (“we are the government”) or on 
the view that by deciding to live in the polity we choose voluntarily to abide by the 
government’s rules (“no one is forcing you to stay here”), the social democrat holds that 
taxation and interventions such as a minimum wage law are not coercive.  The government-
rule structure as they see it is a matter of “social contract” persisting through time and binding 
on the complete collection of citizens.  The implication is that the whole of society is a club, a 
collectively owned property, administered by the government.   
    In “Socialism and Superior Brains” ([1894] 1932), George Bernard Shaw puts it 
plainly: “That great joint-stock company of the future, the Social Democratic State, will have   21
its chairman and directors as surely as its ships will have captains” (279).  Again, the 
superstitions involving a supposed consent to the organization that is the society, and the 
taboos that surround these superstitions enable many to enjoy the purported common 
endeavor—the romance—of the “company,” the “club”—The People. 
 
TPR in Mundane Political Discourse 
 
Examples drawn from ordinary political discourse illustrate how TPR lurks in 
mundane policy issues: 
 
•  In 1990, U. S. postmaster general Anthony Frank explained why he opposed 
freedom in postal services: “I am against it, because I believe the U.S. Postal 
Service is a legitimate and necessary public institution that serves an important 
social function as a binding, unifying force in our national life . . . As a public 
institution, it serves all the American people, not merely those groups, areas, or 
segments that are clearly profitable” (47, 49; emphasis in origina).  In a similar 
vein, the Hollywood director and actor Kevin Costner’s film The Postman 
(1997) shows its hero resurecting civilization in post-apocalyptic America by 
restarting the U. S. Postal Service. 
 
•  In promoting the U. S. Census of 2000 in a press, the Census Director Kenneth 
Prewitt said: “every household that returns the form does strengthen the ties 
that bind us together as a civilized society” (2000). 
 
•  A spokesman for the Natural Resources Defense Council, a left-wing pressure 
group, measured the success of recycling: “Recycling is probably the single 
most successful environmental policy out there.  Most people in the world 
today know about reduce, reuse, recycle.  It is very widely practiced.  More 
people participate voluntarily in recycling than voted in the last four 
presidential elections” (qtd. in Rembert 1997).  Thus, recycling—typically   22
promulgated by government and subsidized with tax-dollars—is successful 




TPR’s Explanatory Power 
 
Besides taking TPR from the horse’s mouth, we may infer it from the horse’s 
behavior.  Taking TPR into account helps to explain much that otherwise remains only poorly 
explained.   
Many people, particularly ones who in the American context would tend to vote 
Democrat or Green, are inclined to support economic restrictions such union privileges, 
occupational licensing, the minimum wage, housing market-controls, the postal monopoly, 
and import restrictions.  Yet knowledgeable economists agree that these restrictions are bad 
for humankind.  Perhaps their support arises because TPR requires, as Bukharin and 
Preobrazhensky put it, that activities be statified.  What seems primary is not often how well 
the program or policy achieves stated goals of improving education, mobility, opportunity, 
and so onbut instead the collective endeavor itself.   
Why do people who claim to be concerned for the poor so often support or go along 
with policies that are obviously and predictably bad for society and especially the poor?  Why 
do they support government schooling, antidevelopment land-use policies, rail transit projects, 
and policies to discourage the use of the private automobile?  TPR provides an explanation: 
these policies bind people together (like a bundle of sticks).       
Many populists, right and left, oppose free trade, alleging that it will hurt low-skilled 
workers.  Even if that claim were true, however, why do they leave out of their consideration 
low-skilled Chinese or Brazilians?  Answer: TPR is about we Americans.  “The People”   23
excludes “the other people.” TPR helps explain why “distributive justice” reaches only to the 
border.  If you scratch an egalitarian you’ll often find TPR.   
I suspect that a large part of the impetus behind the welfare state is the yearning for a 
collective enterprise: “We” taking care of “Ourselves.”  In this theater, some have to be cast 
as the needy, helpless, disadvantaged, inferior, and so on.  I suspect that one reason coercive 
egalitarians feel that “the disadvantaged” deserve government support is that the scheme 
demeans and exploits them, so that the assistance is a sort of compensation. 
Why are people uneasy about globalization?  The communitarian Alasdair MacIntyre 
rightly says: “Patriotism cannot be what it was because we lack in the fullest sense a patria.  . 
. .  In any society where government does not express or represent the moral community of 
the citizens . . . the nature of political obligation becomes systematically unclear” (1984, 254).  
Globalization blurs the “we,” dissolves political obligation, and deflates TPR.   
Why are government officials and enthusiasts often hostile to leading corporations like 
Microsoft, McDonald’s, Wal-Mart, and Martha Stewart?  Why are they often hostile to other 
bases for independent private cultural power such as private builders, private schools, and talk 
radio?  Part of the answer may be that they are jealous in guarding their role as medium and 
focal point in TPR.  Why are they hostile to placeless “suburban sprawl,” private 
communities, private shopping malls, the private automobile (especially big ones), gun 
ownership and toting, and home schooling?  Because these practices are means of 
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Randolph Bourne famously said “War is the health of the State.”  In war, TPR swells 
and rends libertarian constraints: 
 
War is the health of the State.  It automatically sets in motion throughout society 
those irresistible forces for uniformity, for passionate cooperation with the 
Government in coercing into obedience the minority groups and individuals 
which lack the larger herd instinct. [War] seems to achieve for a nation almost 
all that the most inflamed political idealist could desire.  Citizens are no longer 
indifferent to their Government, but each cell of the body politic is brimming 
with life and activity.  We are at last on the way to the full realization of that 
collective community in which each individual somehow contains the virtue of 
the whole.  In a nation at war, every citizen identifies himself with the whole, 
and feels immensely strengthened in that identification. ([1919] 1964, 71) 
 
TPR helps to explain why Americans who lived through World War II generally 
remember it as a good time, even a time of improving material conditions, even though, as 
Robert Higgs (1992) shows, it was a time of significantly declining material conditions.   
TPR captures what William James sought in the “moral equivalent of war,” --namely 
“a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part 
of the army enlisted” to dig coal, make tunnels, wash clothes, catch fish.  “[We should be] 
conscious of our work as an obligatory service to the state.  We should be owned, as soldiers 
are by the army, and our pride would rise accordingly” ([1910] 1963, 299, 300; italics in the 
original).  In Great Britain at the Labour Party Conference of 1945, Sir Stafford Cripps said: 
“We have got to engender in the people the same spirit of determination to see this 
programme through that they have displayed in winning victory in the war” (quoted in Jewkes 
1948: 227).
6 
                                                 
6 John Jewkes (1948, 227-29) targeted TPR in his criticism of social democracy in Great Britain.   25
TPR helps explain why ambitious government programs are so often pitched in the 
metaphor of war, as in the war on vice, the war on illiteracy, the war on poverty, the war on 
crime, the war on disease, the war on AIDS, the war on hunger, and the war on drugs. 
Now Americans have the war on terrorism.  This program actually is war—after 
September 11, 2001, when Americans were attacked and killed The U. S. government invaded 
Afghanistan--but in many respects it is better understood as the new giant in the parade of war 
frauds. 
 
Four Points of Origins  
 
One can speculate on the origins of TPR in human evolution and in the universals of 
human experience.  Here I suggest four sources: 
 
1.  Socio-biological and cultural evolution.  Millions of years of primate 
evolution and more than one million years of human evolution in hunter-
gatherer bands of fifty to one hundred people might well have selected for 
TPR.  Major group experiences were encompassing.  Interpretation of affairs 
was static and common to all (even if bits of information were not).  Leaders 
provided focal points for the entire band.  The yearning and ethic of TPR may 
well have advanced group selection, and, with sanctions against deviants, 
genetic and individual selection as well.  Hayek (1976,1978,1988) explained 
the atavism of social justice; likewise, one might build an argument about the 
atavism of TPR.
7   
 
                                                 
7 Paul Rubin (2002, 2003) presents an argument about various statist tendencies as atavistic, but nothing like 
encompassing sentiment coordination.   26
2.  Society as family: government as parent.  The economist Deirdre McCloskey 
notes that it is difficult to teach market theory to the eighteen-year-old because 
she “has lived mainly in a socialist economy, namely, her birth household, 
centrally planned by her parents, depending on loyalty rather than exit” (2000, 
185).  The “socialist economy” metaphor is imperfect but highly suggestive.  
Relationships in the household are communal and altruistic.  Especially for the 
formative period prior to puberty, the child is reared obeying a supreme central 
authority that routinely circumscribes and overrides her own judgment and 
coordinates activities in a top-down fashion.  The supreme authority also 
validates an authoritative interpretation and justification of things (“because I 
said so”).  The family is the cradle of encompassing sentiment coordination.  It 
is plausible that the individual’s thought patterns would follow that mental 
model in dealing with other social issues.  The family romance may function as 
a sort of prototype of TPR.  The history of government, of political philosophy, 
and of political culture is replete with metaphors that interpret society as 
family and government as parent.  Nowadays, both Irving Kristol on the right 
and George Lakoff on the left embrace an interpretation of politics as vying 
models of parental government, in the one case damning the indulgent 
Mommy State (Kristol 2000) and in the other damning the strict Father State 
(Lakoff 2002).  Both ignore the option of not seeing government as parent. 
  
3.  Society as being: government as head.  Works like Marvin Minsky’s The 
Society of Mind (1986) argue that the individual human being is a society of 
subagents and faculties that is largely hierarchical.  It is not a process of 
voluntary individual action between coequals, a process generating a   27
polycentric network of relations,
8  but rather a top-down kind of society, and it 
displays nothing analogous to the price system.  The “social structure” of the 
self is based on command, repression, and banishment.  In these respects, the 
internal structure of the self is much like a state, which governs by command 
and brooks no competition.  Within the “society” of the self, the achievement 
of joy—whether a tranquil serenity or a moving sense of catharsis—probably 
has much to do with a coordination of feelings such that no major feeling 
upsets the convergence of all other feelings.  We feel joyful or “whole” when 
nothing inside us pulls in a separate direction.  This concordance within the 
self may be another prototype for TPR.  The history of political philosophy and 
social theory is replete with metaphors of society-as-being and government-as-
head.   
 
4.  Society as organization: government as director.  Intentional organizations—
churches, clubs, associations, companies, schools, charities—provide yet 
another mental model for understanding and relating to society.  Any 
intentional community, even if not formally declared, is a sort of organization, 
insofar as its members think of themselves as belonging to the set of people 
who have agreed to an enduring governance structure for the collection of 
members.  The notion of society as organization is pervasive in mundane and 
high-brow political discourse.  Again, members of an organization seek 
meaning in identifying with the organization and in sharing in its mission, 
purposes, and experiences, which make for some degree of community.  The 
individual may extend this model and seek an encompassing sense of 
                                                 
8 Hayek stresses this difference between the mind and social spontaneous order (1967, 74).   28
community in society at large, with government as leader or director of the 
supposed organization. 
 
More on Government Coercion as an Assertion of TPR 
 
If anyone other than the government issued a serious threat to harm us for employing 
people at a wage of less than eight dollars per hour, that person would be regarded as a 
coercive menace.  As FrϑdϑricBastiat noted, when the government coerces people, it does 
what would be criminal for anyone else to do (1995, 52).  It asserts its singular authority to 
violate the liberty of innocent people.  It asserts a kind of fundamental ownership of the 
people themselves; hence many statists say liberty is illusory.  Asserting this privileged 
position serves TPR, for the coercive programs force all to admit their subordination vis-à-vis 
the government, and therefore to recognize the government as a unique, superpowerful 
romantic force.   
Thus, TPR explains why atrocious policies such as the war on drugs can be enacted 
and cheered and can persist.  Even though Republicans supposedly care about freedom and 
Democrats supposedly care about “the little guy,” the politicians do nothing to abate the 
policy.  The vast majority of academic Democrats have never lifted a finger against this overt 
Nazism.  As for the general population, although public opinion on the matter has shifted in 
the libertarian direction, it has favored the policy for generations.  Many watch COPS on 
television to see real-life Gestapo-like bullies bust into private homes and drag off defenseless 
innocents to be locked in cages like animals.  Thomas Szasz (1974, 1992) provides an 
explanation that makes this despicable undertaking understandable in terms of TPR.  The 
targeting of drugs, drug addicts, and drug pushers is a modern instantiation of the primitive 
impulse to find a scapegoat against which the power and unity of the group can be organized,   29
exercised, flaunted, and exulted in.  Szasz observes that drug-abuse hysteria and the war on 
drugs “are pretexts for scapegoating deviants and strengthening the State”(1992: 62).   “[A]s a 
propaganda tool, dangerous drugs are therapeutic for the body politic of the nation, welding 
our heterogeneous society together into one country and one people” (115).   
The more shocking the violation, the more aroused is TPR.  Even now, after a lapse of 
some senvety years, mainstream statists still lionize the  riot of intervention that occurred 
during  the New Deal era--a riot that in actuality deepened and prolonged the Great 
Depression (Higgs 1997) and shackled the country to terrible policies--as a great event during 
a time in which “the country came together” and “we” did something.  What “we did” was 
assert and advance TPR. 
    When the policy process gets rolling, it often seems that what matters most is that “we 
do something.”  Any new coercive intervention, any expenditure of tax dollars, is preferred to 
doing nothing at all, maybe because “doing something” asserts the government’s supremacy 
over libertarian principles, and that assertion serves TPR.   
 
Why Are Intellectuals Who Are Pro-Welfare State and Anti-Regulatory 
State So Rare? 
 
    Political visions do battle over which ideas should be focal in the public 
understandings of the polity.  In the clash of visions, the competing ideas become symbolic.  
Even narrow-issue policy choices are suffused with broad connotations and concern for what 
ideas a choice seems to affirm or negate.   
    Why are economists not more vocal in advocating the repeal of a wide variety of 
pernicious interventions, such as agricultural subsidies and restrictions?  One reason might be 
that some economists see the TPR benefit, but the main answer probably lies in the symbolic   30
realm of TPR versus its libertarian annihilation.  The intellectuals who favor TPR are 
disinclined to throw their weight behind anything that could weaken TPR.   
    I have been involved in academic economics for twenty years, and during that time I 
have taken note of the views or judgments that vocal economists express or neglect to 
express.  I have always been exasperated that my fellow economists do not speak more clearly 
and preponderantly against a wide array of microeconomic interventions that are plainly bad 
in every respect—especially in their promotion of TPR.   
    Whereas libertarian economists oppose both the welfare state and the regulatory state, 
the social-democratic economists support the welfare state and, well, do not speak very 
clearly about the regulatory state.  Asymmetric information apperantly makes it difficult to 
say for sure whether expert caregivers who have the best knowledge of the patient’s history, 
condition, and options should be able to utilize medical therapies that Food and Drug 
Administration bureaucrats have not certified.  In letter delivery, free enterprise, might 
generate natural monopoly, so maybe it is better to have a government monopoly.   
    Facetiousness aside, why do Paul Krugman, Bradford DeLong, Joseph Stiglitz, 
Kenneth Arrow, Robert Solow, James Tobin,
9 Alan Krueger, Richard Freeman, John K. 
Galbraith, James K. Galbraith, and others in their ideological quarters, including a great many 
who are not as prominent but just as settled in their opinions, almost never emphatically favor 
libertarian reform on any of the one thousand issues where such reform would plainly benefit 
society, especially the least well off?  TPR might help us understand why we find few 
unequivocal characters
10 in the Yes-No cell where they would be in favor of the welfare state 
but opposed to the regulatory state.   
    One explanation for the rarity of outspoken Yes-No economists might be that the 
reasons against both the welfare state and the regulatory state come down to the same body of 
                                                 
9 Let it be noted, however, that Tobin (1965) strongly condemns the minimum wage and union privileges. 
10 Mancur Olson may have been a real Yes-No economist.  A few other half-hearteds—none dramatic in 
propounding free-market reforms—are Alan Blinder, Lawrence Summers, Robert Frank, and Peter Lindert.     31
ideas, which one either appreciates or does not.  I am inclined to say, however, that it does not 
require a fine understanding to see the badness in 90 percent of the regulatory state.  Any 
candid person who diligently considers libertarian alternatives to existing interventions should 
see the badness in policy after policy and should thereafter stand firmly for much freer 
markets.  Also, it is not clear to me that all libertarians appreciate certain body of refined 
ideas; some people simply seem to be soberly immune to TPR, as if by disposition. They see 
no good reason to favor government but they never acquire much appreciation of the 
arguments for libertarian policy.   
    The rarity of opposition to the regulatory state among those intellectuals who favor the 
welfare state may lie in the fact that TPR lurks behind their support of both.  Other 
worthwhile explanations certainly exist, but this explanation, based on a weakness for and 
protectiveness toward TPR, deserves consideration. 
 
 
Is TPR Necessarily Anti-Libertarian? 
 
I have suggested that TPR and libertarian policy goals are fundamentally at odds.  This 
relationship is not strictly definitional.  An outstanding counterexample would be the 
American Revolution, which fed or instantiated TPR yet advanced libertarian policy goals.  A 
war effort is not necessarily antilibertarian on the whole—ridding a territory of slavery or the 
world of a Hitler obviously has a libertarian resonance--but the exceptions are rare.  What I 
mean by TPR is something that, in ordinary domestic affairs, is antilibertarian pretty much in 
its essence. 
The individuals of a country or region might be said to form “a people” on the basis of 
their language, customs, and traditions.  As an American who in recent years has gained an 
ordinary residence and family in Stockholm, I have noticed all manner of distinctive Swedish   32
customs involving language, food, drink, drinking songs, folk songs, holidays, popular 
children’s characters and stories, sports, the Swedish royal family, and so on.  These 
elements—especially the language—are part of “being Swedish,” common cultural reference 
points.  They are practiced for the most part by individuals and families to the extent and in 
the manner that they personally choose and for their own private—if traditional—experience.  
They are available but not requisite.  They do not project a collective narrative and in that 
sense,do not usually make for an encompassing experience.  They are ways of communing 
with other persons, not ways of communing as The People. 
In 1959, Ingemar Johansson astounded the boxing world by knocking out Floyd 
Patterson in the third round and capturing the title as World Heavy-Weight champion.  
Swedish pride in the event is depicted in the small-town story My Life as a Dog.  Throughout 
the movie there is no sign of national or collective identity—indeed, the movie celebrates 
personal idiosyncrasy—until the final moments, which show almost everyone absorbed by the 
radio broadcast and then running into the street screaming “Hurray for Ingo!” “Hurray for 
Sweden!”  Ingo’s victory—Sweden’s victory—was a shared experience that engendered an 
encompassing coordination of sentiment.  The feeling when Sweden goes to the World Cup 
finals must be similar.  I regard such a narrative and romance as related to but different from 
TPR.  It might be a romance of the people, but not of The People.  Let’s face it, when 
Swedish boxers or soccer teams don’t win big, only the die-hard fans take much notice.  Ingo 
Johansson is a national hero, but the romance is just an underdog or Cinderella story that has 
universal appeal.  You need not be Swedish for tears to well up at the conclusion of My Life 
as a Dog.  Muhammad Ali is a hero and a major figure for some people, but he is not 
particularly a national hero simply because he is American and Americans dominate in 
boxing.  He is, however, a local hero of his home town of Louisville, Kentucky.   33
Moment-in-the-sun event such as winning the World Cup are jubilant common 
experience for the citizens of the country in question, just as a tragic event like the death of 
Princess Diana is a common experience for her subjects.  These events, however, are not The 
People’s story.  What is significant about TPR is that The People are not merely the auditors, 
but are identified as (or strongly identified with) the protagonists of the story. Widely 
practiced traditions and folk customs are fertile ground for coordinated sentiment, for 
Smithian sympathy, for club romance, and may be so common that they foster a sense of “The 
People.” Even when customs involving national icons such as the national flag engender the 
acting out of a ritual in every single backyard, and everyone knows that everyone is in his or 
her backyard doing the same, and everyone knows that everyone knows, it is not TPR.  In 
themselves, such activities are not encompassing experiences and are not of The People.  
By contrast, governmental structures and policies are routinely identified as The 
People’s.  For generations in Sweden, the Social Democratic vision was officially trumpeted 
as “The People’s Home” (Folkhemmet).  (Nowadays the term is too trite and corny to be 
effective as a political slogan, but the Social Democrats still use it nostalgically.)  Today in 
Sweden, democratic mythologies still lead people closely to identify governmental structures 
with The People.   
 
  TPR on “the right” 
 
TPR is essential to the left.  For this reason, it is coherent to speak of “the left,” and 
the historic and natural color of the left, found in Europe still, is the warmest, most passionate 
color.  (The new color convention in the United States--blue for the Democrats and red for the 
Republicans-- apparently created by the media in 2000, is just wrong.)  Nevertheless, certain 
types of antileftists also may embrace TPR.     34
“The right” is ill-defined.  As is well known, the political culture has long been 
dominated by leftists, and it is natural that the political culture would reflect their point of 
view, which, crudely, is: If you’re not one of us, you are one of them.  “The right” (or 
“conservatives”) often means all those who are not left.  In the American context, it often 
means anyone who does not favor the Democrats over the Republicans. 
It might be useful to distinguish three sometimes overlappoing kinds of antileftists.  
First, some people positively favor TPR but in a form, such as what George Lakoff (2002) 
calls the “strict father,” that puts them at odds with the leftist agenda.  George Will (1983) 
writes of “statecraft as soulcraft,” and, as Steven Ealy (2004) shows, Will’s penchant for 
collective enterprise, shared values, and shared fate is central to his statism.  The same is 
generally true of the neoconservatives.  A major TPR theater for this group is foreign policy.  
“We” are combating terrorism, liberating Iraq, planting the seeds of democracy, spreading 
freedom, and so forth. 
Second, traditionalists are especially fond of long-established customs and 
institutions, of genuine community that resides in the relations of their families, friendships, 
churches, and Little League activities, and of icons such as the American flag--all of which 
are common in the sense that they often help to create a lattice of club romances.  
Traditionalists like to have barbecues on the Fourth of July, and they like the idea of others 
having barbecues.  They like being of a way of life, but ordinarily they do not require an 
encompassing collective enterprise, experience, or romance.  They favor family rule over 
bureaucrat rule.  Traditionalists might embrace TPR, but doing so is not inherent in their 
traditionalism. 
The libertarians are the third kind. 
Frank Meyer (1996) favored traditionalism and libertarianism.  He told the 
traditionalists that they should tolerate others who choose a different way of life, and he   35
assured them that cherished traditions can survive and even thrive under libertarian policy.  
He urged traditionalists and libertarians ought to get along, in alliance against statism.  I 
concur, and I hasten to add George Will and the neoconservatives to the list of opponents.  
 
Make Liberty TPR? 
 
If innocuous traditions and popular sporting events do not demonstrate compatibility 
between TPR and libertarian policy goals, what about achieving a People’s Romance based 
on liberty?  Perhaps the cherishing of liberty can be a focal point for the encompassing 
coordination of sentiment.  Unfortunately, this candidate for compatibility, too, must be 
rejected. 
Smith (1790, 175-76, 216, 218, 262, 327) and the legal theorist Lon Fuller, in his book 
The Morality of Law (1969, chap. 1), distinguishes two classes of moral rules
11. The more 
basic class comprises the core duties within a community.  Here would reside Hume’s “three 
fundamental laws” of justice (1978, 526) or Smith’s “sacred laws of justice” ([1759] 1976, 
84), namely, the respect for person, property, and agreements.  Here also resides the morality 
of common decency.   These rules are “negative” in nature; they tell us what we are not to do.  
As Smith puts it, “We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing 
nothing” ([1759] 1976, 82).  The man who barely abstains from violating the basic rights of 
others, however, “has surely very little positive merit” (82).  The other class of moral rules 
pertains to what Fuller calls the morality of aspiration.  The latter rules, according to Smith,  
“present us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought to aim at”(175).  They are the 
positive rules, values, and virtues of higher aspirations, excellence, greatness, valor, and the 
                                                 
11 Fuller acknowledges six mid-twentieth-century authors (1969, 5 n. 2)   36
sublime.  Smith and Fuller explain that the principles underlying such virtues are inherently 
loose, vague and indeterminate. 
I see liberty as residing in the first class, and hence not a value or virtue of heroic or 
romantic aspiration.  To refrain from violating the other’s liberty, from extorting and bullying, 
is not the realization of a lofty aspiration, but a minimal requirement of decency.  Whereas  
TPR needs to supply a positive story of action and achievement, the basic laws of justice do 
not project any dramatic endeavor.  Rather, they leave individuals to undertake their own 
private projections.  Fuller, in fact, relates the ideas of the Soviet author Eugene Pashukanis, 
liquidated in 1937, who explained that the concepts of basic moral and legal duty are part and 
parcel of capitalistic spontaneous order and that communism would repeal economic 
exchange and hence the morality of duty(1969, 24-26).  The morality of communism, 
Pashukanis claimed, would be a morality of collective aspiration, which the morality of 
spontaneous order cannot generate or even accommodate.  As James Buchanan puts it, “To 
lay down a ‘social’ purpose, even as a target, is to contradict the principle of liberalism” 
(2000, 115). 
That libertarian principles cannot give wings to TPR was also recognized by J. G. 
Fichte, an early rabble-rouser for The German TPR.  In his Addresses to the German Nation 
in 1808 he said:  “What spirit has an undisputed right to summon and to order everyone 
concerned, whether he himself be willing or not, and to compel anyone who resists, to risk 
everything including his life?  Not the spirit of the peaceful citizen’s love for the constitution 
and the laws, but the devouring flame of higher patriotism, which embraces the nation as the 
vesture of the eternal” ([1808] 1968, 120, see also 125-26). 
 
The inability of libertarian principles to vitalize TPR is a sort of corollary to an old 
theme in classical-liberal economics:  economic understanding brings depression to the   37
student and unpopularity to the teacher.  Economic understanding deflates TPR, so economic 
ignorance is bliss.  In 1944 Hayek noted “the traditional unpopularity of the economists,” 
adding,  “You probably all know the remark of Walter Bagehot that the public has never yet 
been sorry to hear of the death of an economist.  In fact, the dislike for most of the teaching of 
the economists in the past has built up a picture of the economist as a sort of monster 
devouring children” ([1944] 1991 39).  George Stigler described good economists as the 
pourers of cold water (1988, 4). 
 
The Neglected Shrine of Liberty 
 
High patriotic romance might be combined with a libertarian ethic only if society 
faced repeated skirmishes in which liberty-minded people fended off the conquest and pillage 
of would-be coercers.  The only image we might have today of an ongoing aspiration for 
liberty would be the broad cultural battle against statism.  To propose this battle as a 
foundation for TPR, however, would be to suggest a broad popular enthusiasm and 
involvement in libertarian think tanks, reform efforts, and cultural and educational programs, 
and  such a suggestion would be ludicrous. 
A sustained romantic involvement in liberty seems to call for more than a one-time 
event, however momentous that might be.  The American Revolution was broadly a fight for 
liberty against a government oppressor, and it had a libertarian philosophical vision (Bailyn 
1967).  In an essay entitled “From the Memoirs of a Subject of the United States,” (1972), H. 
L. Mencken observes that Americans yearn for a grand and noble political vision, yet find no 
answer.  He then suggests one, represented by a peculiar shrine: 
 
It is somewhat astonishing that 100% Americans should wander so helplessly in 
this wilderness.  For there is a well-paved road across the whole waste, and it   38
issues, at its place of beginning, from the tombs of the Fathers, and their sacred 
and immemorial dust.  Straight as a pistol shot it runs, until at the other end it 
sweeps up a glittering slope to a shrine upon a high hill.  This shrine may be 
seen on fair days for many leagues, and presents a magnificent spectacle.  Its 
base is confected of the bones of Revolutionary heroes, and out of them rises an 
heroic effigy of George Washington, in alabaster.  Surrounding this effigy, and 
on a slightly smaller scale, are graven images of Jefferson, Franklin, Nathan 
Hale, old Sam Adams, John Hancock and Paul Revere, each with a Bible under 
his arm and the Stars and Stripes fluttering over his shoulder.  A bit to the rear, 
and without the Bible, is a statue of Thomas Paine.  Over the whole structure 
stretch great bands of the tricolor, in silk, satin and other precious fabrics.  Red 
and white stripes run up and down the legs of Washington, and his waistcoat is 
spattered with stars.  The effect is the grandiose one of a Democratic national 
convention.  At night, in the American manner, spotlights play upon the shrine.  
Hot dogs are on sale nearby, that pilgrims may not hunger, and there is a free 
park for Fords, with running water and booths for the sale of spare parts.  It is 
the shrine of Liberty! (72-73) 
 
Mencken then assesses the success of this shrine and cause: 
 
But where are the pilgrims?  One observes the immense parking space and the 
huge pyramids of hot dogs, and one looks for great hordes of worshipers, 
fighting their way to the altar-steps.  But they are non est.  Now and then a 
honeymoon couple wanders in from the rural South or Middle West, to gape at 
the splendors hand in hand, and now and then a schoolma'm arrives with a flock 
of her pupils, and lectures them solemnly out of a book.  More often, perhaps, a 
foreign visitor is to be seen, with a couronne of tin bay-leaves under his arm.  
He deposits the couronne at the foot of Washington, crosses himself 
lugubriously, and retires to the nearest hot dog stand.  But where are the 
Americanos?  Where are the he-men, heirs to the heroes whose gilded skulls 
here wait the Judgment Day?  Where are the Americanizers?  Where are the 
boosters and boomers?  Where are the sturdy Coolidge men?  Where are the 
Rotarians, Kiwanians, Lions?  Where are the authors of newspaper editorials?    39
The visionaries of Chautauqua?  The keepers of the national idealism?  Go 
search for them, if you don't trust the first report of your eyes!  Go search for 
honest men in Congress!  They are simply not present.  For among all the 
visions that now inflame forward-looking and up-and-coming men in this great 
Republic, there is no sign any more of the one that is older than all the rest, and 
that is the vision of Liberty.  The Fathers saw it, and the devotion they gave to it 
went far beyond three cheers a week.  It survived into Jackson's time, and its 
glow was renewed in Lincoln's.  But now it is no more. (73-74). 
 
Mencken’s essay is fundamentally wistful.  He laments that the vision of Liberty does 
not inspire and motivate, and he is somewhat perplexed about the failure.  Between all the 
jests is an earnest call—“Back to Bach!,” he declares—to return to the original libertarian 
vision.  Yet the inherent weakness of Liberty as an ongoing political rallying cry is made clear 
enough in Mencken’s recognition of what political enthusiasm and force really consist of—a 
recognition conveyed in the shrine’s vulgarity and in Mencken’s concluding 
paragraph:“Against all this I protest, feebly and too late.  The land swarms with Men of 
Vision, all pining for Service.  What I propose is that they forget their brummagem Grails for 
one week, and concentrate their pep upon a chase that really leads uphill.  Let us have a Bill 
of Rights Week.  Let us have a Common Decency Week“ (78).  The notion of Service (as in, 
“public service”) and the notion of a This-or-That Week typify the character of politics and 
illustrate how TPR manifests itself in what seem to be innocuous political efforts.  During 
This-or-That week we shall (supposedly) all ruminate and deliberate on This-or-That, 
bringing our thoughts and sentiments into an encompassing coordination.  Instituting an 
official This-or-That Week is a way of claiming approval and validation for certain ideas, 
values, and implied programs--of asserting The People have officially chosen certain policies.   
It is a manner of asserting The People’s ownership over and above the individual’s ownership   40
of his person and property.  In his satirical “Common Decency Week,” Mencken is telling us 
that any political action with encompassing pretensions is at odds with common decency. 
 
Liberty Enlightening the World 
 
Another failure of liberty to propel TPR is the colossal statue that was originally called 
Liberty Enlightening the World.  The project was conceived by the Frenchman Édouard-René 
Lefebvre de Laboulaye (1811-83), a law professor, prolific political writer, inspiring speaker, 
and member and later senator for life in the National Assembly.  Although not a radical 
liberal, Laboulaye was a fervent liberal republican who lionized American liberty and 
constitutionalism (and propounded Lincoln’s side in the Civil War).  He conceived of a 
monument donated by the citizens of France to the United States to commemorate the 
centennial of 1776.  He and a group of like-minded intellectuals realized the project.  The 
statue’s sculptor and other great champion, Auguste Bartholdi, too, was also a strong partisan 
of liberty. (Tractenberg 1977, 22, 31-34, 57-59, 75, 81).  The project was libertarian in its 
execution.  On both sides of the Atlantic, practically all support was voluntary, making 
Liberty Enlightening the World a monumental example of the voluntary provision of a public 
good.
12   
The libertarian aspects were enhanced by Grover Cleveland, first in 1884 as governor 
of New York by vetoing a fifty –thousand-dollar state appropriation to aid the project, and 
second, as president of the United States at the unveiling ceremony two years later, by 
delivering words that perfectly captured the intended meaning of the monument: “We will not 
forget that Liberty has made here her home, nor shall her chosen altar be neglected.  Willing 
                                                 
12 The French government contributed a naval vessel for the statue’s shipment to the U.S.  Because Bedloe’s 
Island (now Liberty Island) was and remains federal government property, the U.S. government naturally played 
a role in fixing up the island and hosting the inaugural ceremony.  See Trachtenberg 1977, 38, 140, 148, 179; 
Blanchet and Dard 1985, 62, 71, 73, 92.   41
votaries will constantly keep alive its fires and these shall gleam upon the shores of our sister 
Republic in the East.  Reflected thence and joined with answering rays, a stream of light shall 
pierce the darkness of ignorance and man’s oppression until Liberty enlightens the world” 
(qtd in Trachtenberg 1977, 83). 
Cleveland saw the light, but his prediction about willing votaries quickly proved 
wrong.  Almost immediately the interpretation changed.  As Marvin Trachtenberg explains, 
 
As early as 1883 [three years before the statue was completed] the French 
meanings were lost on Emma Lazarus.  In her famous poem “The New 
Colossus,” the beacon of liberty seen across the sea was not intended to serve 
France or any other nation, but rather to guide those Europeans eager for a new 
life away from Europe entirely, to the “golden door” of America, where an 
uplifted torch was symbolic not of “enlightenment” but simply of “welcome.” . . 
. [I]n 1903, at the height of immigration, this sentiment was so widely accepted 
as expressing the statue’s meaning that a plaque bearing the poem was affixed to 
the pedestal as an ex post facto inscription. (1977, 187) 
 
Thus the statue, a symbol of universal human liberty projected outward by the torch of 
enlightenment, not by the sword, with a face that “expresses not only triumph but embittered 
desire”(Trachtenberg  1977, 60), was quickly transformed into a symbol of The American 
People.  “The statue was becoming the image not so much of America the protagonist of 
Liberty, but simply America itself” (p. 187).  Soon Liberty assumed a belligerent mien on 
posters for Liberty Bonds, which asserted the citizen’s duty to pony up for the U.S. 
government’s involvement in the First World War.
13   
Although libertarian groups sometimes find an icon in Liberty, most Americans are 
oblivious to its libertarian message.  With its charismatic size, design, location, and 
connection to “the golden door,” the Statue of Liberty is regarded by many as simply a 
                                                 
13 See images of Blanchet and Dard 1985, 124, 127, 152.   42
favorite among the national monuments, another colossal decoration and landmark.  
Laboulaye’s attempt to create a libertarian monument, to channel collective romance in the 
libertarian direction, has yet to succeed. 
Libertarian Machiavellianism probably sometimes ought to promulgate and 
manipulate TPR to effect reform, enhance order or win an election,  but doing so is a matter 
of exigent political strategy.  That aside, I am inclined to conclude that TPR itself will never 
advance liberty, that TPR is simply something to lament and to try to deflate.  Even where it 
might take harmless or possibly even vaguely libertarian forms, the danger exist that it will be 
hijacked for purposes that arouse and feed its coercive appetites.  Decent, enlightened people 
must relinquish TPR.  
 
Deflating The People’s Romance: Some Grounds for Optimism  
 
Again, many factors besides TPR could help explain the stupendous errors that 
constitute statism.  In addition to the general problems of using government to garner 
privileges and resources and the problem of government-dominated cultural institutions, there 
are the more all-too-human problems of the intellectual’s anxiousness for the prestige of what 
he imagines to be an elite or governing set, citizens’ anxiousness for official validation from 
and subordination to a phantom lord, and the basic reverence of power and permanence.  My 
ruminations about TPR, then, should be understood as one explanation, not the explanation, 
for statism’s sway. 
I suspect, however, that TPR is quite central, and that it relates to the other factors, 
so if it were to be significantly abated, statism also would.   In The Study of Man, Michael 
Polanyi observes that explicitly formulated knowledge offers the opportunity for us to reflect 
on it critically(1963, 15).  Man’s theories of man are inherently dialectical.  Formulating a   43
theory that is true is often part of a process that retires its truth.  Explaining to people that they 
have an unhealthy penchant for sweets is part of the process of subduing that penchant.  
Likewise, TPR can be overcome or at least abated mainly by the usual methods of critical 
discussion and persuasion.  
TPR is probably general to humankind, but its force depends on circumstances.  I 
believe that technological developments in communications and transportation have 
diminished the power of TPR, and I expect the trend to continue.  We do not belong to a 
single well-defined group but rather, increasingly, to many loosely defined groups, and those 
groups are increasingly of our own choosing.  The structures we experience are less 
organizational and more networked and spontaneous.  Our epistemic instincts are constantly 
challenged.  We get used to “knowing” many people of celebrity who do not know us.  
Meanwhile, we do not know the fellow who lives next door.  People pursue their own 
interests and communities and freely ignore the vast social oceans that lap against the walls of 
their homes.  Increasingly, there is no common experience, and people know it, if only on a 
visceral level.  Disjointedness proliferates not only in experience, but in interpretation of 
public affairs.  The official political culture is losing its dominance.  People increasingly 
ignore the major media.  They go to the websites, radio programs, and cable television 
stations that offer the interpretations they prefer.  These competitive commentaries take aim at 
the official interpretation and thereby turn news itself into the news. Media success stories 
like television’s John Stossel and radio’s Larry Elder, as well as many of the popular 
intellectual web logs, show that the current market demand can sustain a libertarian line, and 
the demand might increase as awareness of this viewpoint grows.  Big government can still 
exercise brute force and other forms of power, but can it retain popular support?  The impulse 
and agenda to create an encompassing common experience, an encompassing government-led 
romance, is received with increasing skepticism.     44
Also significant is the growing disenchantment with the single greatest TPR-
indoctrination program, government schooling.  Scattered prospects for school-choice reform 
exist in the United States,  and a growing number of families are opting for home schooling, 
the networks of which have a strong libertarian streak (as well as a religious streak).  In 
general, the popular aura of “the common school system” is fading. As it carries on in a state 
of demoralization, the attitude it engenders in students may be better represented by Bart 
Simpson than by TPR. 
The very boundaries of the polity are becoming increasingly blurred.  People and their 
electronic messages (increasingly in English) traverse borders with increasing ease.  
Globalization erases demarcations between the people of the earth.   
On the intellectual front, we have seen a real weakening of statist precepts and commitments.  
The academic field of public choice has examined “politics without romance,” as James 
Buchanan puts it.  He writes: “The rapidly accumulating developments in the theory of public 
choice . . . have all been influential in modifying the way that modern man views government 
and political process.  The romance is gone, perhaps never to be regained”. ( [1979] 1999, 
57).  Buchanan’s words are overly optimistic, but correct in essence.  The intellectual scene is 
increasingly policy oriented, increasingly framed in sensible ways that rule TPR out of court.  
Optimism lies in the fact that those intellectual battles are winnable.  Academia in the United 
States continues to be dominated by social democrats, but their ability to rally students to TPR 
dwindles, and their statism is becoming less righteous and absolute. 
It remains unclear, however, whether intellectual victory matters much for the course 
of policy.  The more developed countries, on the whole, have not made bold changes in the 
size and intrusiveness of government; at best they have slowed expansion.  Many less-
developed-countries have liberalized significantly, for the most part by undoing egregious 
policies, not by leapfrogging toward liberty beyond the Western norm.     45
Another big “however” is the problem of militarism, mass destruction, and terrorism.  
Not only war The People’s most fervent romance, it is, to paraphrase Randolph Bourne, The 
People’s most liberating romance. 
Still, barring major war, the prospects for deflating TPR are looking up (for this 
reason, I suspect the Democratic Party is in serious trouble).  Correspondingly, the prospects 
for a libertarian enrichment of culture are also looking up.  Even if policy isn’t fixed, even if 
the overall political culture is not improving, wealth and technology are increasingly enabling 
individuals to resist and withdraw from the dominant political culture.  That culture does not 
engulf people as it did previously.  We may look forward to diverse political cultures that 
accommodate vibrant communities of the mind wise to the statist quackeries and 
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